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Abstract 
How do our brains so effectively achieve adaptive behavior in a changing world? Evidence 
is reviewed that brains are organized into parallel processing streams with complementary 
properties. Hierarchical interactions within each stream and parallel interactions between 
streams create coherent behavioral representations that overcome the complementary 
deficiencies of each stream and support unitary conscious experiences. This perspective 
suggests how brain design reflects the organization of the physical world with which brains 
interact, and suggests an alternative to the computer metaphor suggesting that brains are 
organized into independent modules. Examples from perception, learning, cognition, and 
action are described, and theoretical concepts and mechanisms by which complementarity is 
accomplished are summarized. 
Many computer scientists have suggested that intelligent systems, our brains 
included, are organized into independent modules, as in a digital computer, and we see by 
processing perceptual qualities such as form, color, and motion using these independent 
modules. The brain's organization into processing streams (DeYoe & van Essen, 1988) 
supports the idea that brain processing is specialized, but it does not, in itself, imply that 
these streams contain independent modules. Independent modules should be able to fully 
compute their particular processes on their own. Much perceptual data argue against the 
existence of independent modules, however, because strong interactions are known to 
occur between perceptual qualities (Egusa, 1983; Faubert & von Grunau, 1995; Kanizsa, 
1974; Pessoa eta!., !996; Smallman & McKee, 1995). For example, changes in perceived 
form or color can cause changes in perceived motion, and conversely; and changes in 
perceived brightness can cause changes in perceived depth, and conversely. How and why 
do these qualities interact? An answer to this question is needed to determine the functional 
and computational units that govern behavior as we know it. 
The present article reviews evidence, along the lines of Grossberg (2000a), that the 
brain's processing streams compute complementary properties. Each stream's properties 
are related to those of a complementary stream much as a lock fits its key, or two pieces of 
a puzzle fit together. It is also suggested how the mechanisms that enable each stream to 
compute one set of properties prevent it from computing a complementary set of properties. 
As a result, each of these streams exhibits complementary strengths and weaknesses. How, 
then, do these complementary properties get synthesized into a consistent behavioral 
experience? It is proposed that interactions between these processing streams overcome 
their complementary deficiencies and generate behavioral properties that realize the unity of 
conscious experiences. In this sense, pairs of complementary streams are the functional 
units because only through their interactions can key behavioral properties be competently 
computed. This conclusion suggests that pairs of complementary streams may comprise the 
structural units that the brain uses to derive complete information about the environment, 
and that emergent properties due to interactions between these streams are the functional 
units that govern behavior. As illustrated below, these interactions may be used to explain 
many of the ways in which perceptual qualities are known to influence each other. Table I 
summaries some pairs of complementary processes that will be described herein. 
TABLE 1 
SOME COMPLEMENTARY PAIRS OF BRAIN PROCESSES 
Boundary completion Surface filling-in 
Boundary orientation Motion direction 
'What' learning and matching 'Where' learning and matching 
Attentive learning Orienting search 
Object tracking Optic flow navigation 
Color Luminance 
Vergence Spherical angle 
Motor expectation Volitional speed 
Sensory cortical representation Learned motivational feedback 
Working memory order Working memory rate 
Why does the brain often need several processing stages to form each processing stream? 
Accumulating evidence suggests that these stages realize a process of hierarchical 
resolution of uncertainty. 'Uncertainty' here means that computing one set of properties at 
a given stage can suppress information about a different set of properties at that stage. As I 
will illustrate below, these uncertainties are proposed to be overcome by using more than 
one processing stage to form a stream. Overcoming informational uncertainty utilizes both 
hierarchical interactions within the stream and the parallel interactions between streams that 
overcome their complementary deficiencies. This observation illustrates from yet another 
perspective that the computational unit is not a single processing stage; it is, rather, 
proposed to be an ensemble of processing stages that interact within and between 
complementary processing streams. 
According to this view, the organization of the brain obeys principles of uncertainty 
and complementarity, just as does the physical world with which brains interact, and of 
which they form a part. I propose that these principles reflect each brain's role as a self-
organizing measuring device in the world, and of the world. Experimental and theoretical 
evidence for complementary processes and processing streams are described below. 
In most of these cases, evidence for the existence of processing streams and their 
role in behavior has been developed by many investigators. The fact that pairs of these 
streams exhibit complementary computational properties, and that successive processing 
stages realize a hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, has only gradually become clear 
through neural modeling, primarily from our group and colleagues. Through a large 
number of such modeling studies, it gradually became clear that different pairs of streams 
realize different combinations of complementary properties, as illustrated below. As of this 
writing, so many streams seem to follow this pattern that I now suggest that 
complementarity may be a general principle of brain design. 
Complementary boundaries and surfaces in visual form perception. 
Visual processing, from the retina through the inferotemporal and parietal cortices, 
provides excellent examples of parallel processing streams (Figure 1 ). What evidence is 
there to suggest that these streams compute complementary properties, and how is this 
clone? A neural theory, called FACADE (Form-Anci-Color-Anci-DEpth) theory, proposes 
that perceptual boundaries are formed in the LGN-Interblob-Interstripe-V4 stream while 
perceptual surfaces are formed in the LGN-Blob-Thin Stripe-V4 stream (Grossberg, 
1994). Many experiments have supported this prediction (e.g., Elder & Zucker, 1998; 
Rogers-Ramachandran & Ramachandran, 1998; Lamme eta!., 1999). 
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Figure 1. Schematic diagram of anatomical connections and neuronal selectivities of early 
visual areas in the macaque monkey. LGN = lateral geniculate nucleus (parvocellular 
(parvo] and magnocellular [magna] divisions. Divisions of visual areas VI and V2; blob= 
cytochrome oxidase blob regions, interblob = cytochrome oxidase-poor regions 
surrounding the blobs, 4B = lamina 4B, thin = thin (narrow) cytochrome oxidase stripes, 
interstripe = cytochrome oxidase-poor regions between the thin and thick stripes, thick = 
thick (wide) cytochrome oxidase stripes, V3 = Visual Area 3, V4 = Visual Area(s) 4, and 
MT =Middle Temporal area. Areas V2, V3, V4, and MT have connections to other areas 
not explicitly represented here. Area V3 may also receive projections from V2 interstripes 
or thin stripes. Heavy lines indicate robust primary connections, and thin lines indicate 
weaker, more variable connections. Dotted lines represent observed connections that 
require additional verification. Icons: rainbow = tuned and/or opponent wavelength 
selectivity (incidence at least 40%), angle symbol= orientation selectivity (incidence at least 
20% ), spectacles= binocular disparity selectivity and/or strong binocular interactions (V2; 
incidence at least 20% ), and right-pointing arrow = direction of motion selectivity 
(incidence at least 20%). [Adapted with permission from DeYoe and van Essen (1988).] 
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Figure 2. A Kanizsa square (A) and a reverse-contrast Kanizsa square (B). The emergent 
Kanizsa square can be seen and recognized because of the enhanced illusory brightness 
within the illusory square. The reverse-contrast Kanizsa square can be recognized but not 
seen. (C) The boundary of the gray disk can form around its entire circumference even 
though the relative contrast between the disk and the white and black background squares 
reverses periodically along the circumference. (D) The vertical illusory contour that forms 
at the ends of the horizontal lines can be consciously recognized even though it cannot be 
seen by virtue of any contrast difference between it and the background. 
FACADE theory suggests how and why perceptual boundaries and perceptual snrfaces 
compute complementary properties. Figure 2A illustrates three pairs of complementary 
properties using the illusory contour percept of a Kanizsa square (Kanizsa, 1974). In 
response to both images of this figure, boundaries form inwardly between cooperating 
pairs of incomplete disk (or pac man) inducers to form the sides of the square. These 
boundaries are oriented to form in a collinear fashion between like-oriented inducers. The 
square boundary in Figure 2A can be both seen and recognized because of the enhanced 
illusory brightness of the Kanizsa square. In contrast, the square boundary in Figure 2B 
can be recognized even though it is not visible; that is, there is no brightness or color 
difference on either side of the boundary. Figure 2B shows that some boundaries can be 
recognized even though they are invisible. FACADE theory predicts that all boundaries are 
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invisible within the boundary stream, which is proposed to occur in the Interblob cortical 
processing stream (Figure 1). This prediction has not yet been directly tested through a 
neurophysiological experiment, although several studies have shown the distinctness of a 
perceptual grouping, such as an illusory contour, can be dissociated from the visible 
stimulus contrast that is associated with it (Hess et al., 1998; Petry & Meyer, 1987). 
The invisible boundary in Figure 2B can be traced to the fact that its vertical 
boundaries form between black and white inducers that possess opposite contrast polarity 
with respect to the gray background. The same is true of the boundary around the gray disk 
in Figure 2C. In this figure, the gray disk lies in front of a textured background whose 
contrasts with respect to the disk reverse across space. In order to build a boundary around 
the entire disk, despite these contrast reversals, the boundary system pools signals from 
opposite contrast polarities at each position. This pooling process renders the boundary 
system output insensitive to contrast polarity. The boundary system hereby loses its 
ability to represent visible colors or brightnesses, since its output cannot signal the 
difference between dark and light. It is in this sense that "all boundaries are invisible". 
These properties of boundary completion are summarized in Figure 3. Figure 2D illustrates 
another invisible boundary that can be consciously recognized. 
If boundaries are invisible, then how do we see anything? FACADE theory predicts 
that visible properties of a scene are represented by the surface processing stream, which is 
predicted to occur within the Blob cortical stream (Figure I). A key step in representing a 
visible surface is called .filling-in. Why does a surface filling-in process occur? An early 
stage of surface processing compensates for variable illumination, or 'discounts the 
i!luminant' (Helmholtz, 191011925; Land, 1977) in order to prevent illuminant variations 
from distorting all percepts. Discounting the illuminant attenuates color and brightness 
BOUNDARY COMPLETION SURFACE FILLING-IN 
oriented unoriented 
inward outward 
insensitive to contrast polarity sensitive to contrast polarity 
Figure 3. In this example of neon color spreading, the color in the gray contours spreads 
in all directions until it fills the square illusory contour. An explanation of this percept is 
given in Grossberg (1994). Three complementary computational properties of visual 
boundaries and surfaces are also described. Boundaries are predicted to be completed 
within a Boundary Contour System (BCS) that passes through the Interblobs of cortical 
area VI, whereas surfaces are filled-in within a Feature Contour System (FCS) that passes 
through the Blobs of cortical area VI (see Figure 1). 
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signals except near regions of sufficiently rapid surface change, such as edges or texture 
gradients, which are relatively uncontaminated by illuminant variations. Later stages of 
surface formation fill in the attenuated regions with these relatively uncontaminated color 
and brightness signals, and do so at the correct relative depths from the observer through a 
process called surface capture. This multi-stage process is an example of hierarchical 
resolution of uncertainty, because the later filling-in stage overcomes uncertainties about 
brightness and color that were caused by discounting the illuminant at an earlier processing 
stage. 
How do the illuminant-discounted signals fill-in an entire region? Filling-in behaves 
like a diffusion of brightness across space (Arrington, 1994; Grossberg & Todorovic', 
1988; Paradiso & Nakayama, 1991). In response to the display in Figure 3, filling-in 
spreads outwardly from the individual gray inducers in all directions. Its spread is thus 
unoriented. How is this spread of activation contained? FACADE theory predicts that 
signals from the boundary stream to the surface stream define the regions within which 
filling-in is restricted. This prediction has not yet been neurophysiologically tested. Without 
these boundary signals, filling-in would dissipate across space, and no surface percept 
could form. Invisible boundaries hereby indirectly assure their own visibility through their 
interactions with the surface stream. 
For example, in Figure 2A, the square boundary is induced by four black pac man 
disks that are all Jess Juminant than the white background. In the surface stream, 
discounting the illuminant causes these pac men to induce local brightness contrasts within 
the boundary of the square. At a subsequent processing stage, these brightness contrasts 
trigger surface filling-in within the square boundary. The filled-in square is visible as a 
brightness difference because the filled-in activity level within the square differs from the 
filled-in activity of the surrounding region. Filling-in can lead to visible percepts because it 
is sensitive to contrast polarity. These three properties of surface filling-in are summarized 
in Figure 3. They are clearly complementary to the corresponding properties of boundary 
completion. 
In Figure 2B, the opposite polarities of the two pairs of pac men with respect to the 
gray background lead to approximately equal filled-in activities inside and outside the 
square, so the boundary can be recognized but not seen. In Figure 2D, the white 
background can fill-in uniformly on both sides of the vertical boundary, so no visible 
contrast difference is seen. 
These remarks just begin the analysis of filling-in. Even in the Kanizsa square, one 
often perceives a square hovering in front of four partially occluded circular disks, which 
seem to be completed behind the square. FACADE theory predicts how surface filling-in is 
organized to help such figure-ground percepts to occur, in response to both two-
dimensional pictures and three-dimensional scenes (Grossberg, 1994, 1997; Grossberg 
and McLoughlin, 1997). 
In summary, boundary and surface formation illustrate two key principles of brain 
organization: hierarchical resolution of uncertainty, and complementary interstream 
interactions. Figure 3 summarizes three pairs of complementary properties of the boundary 
and surface streams. Hierarchical resolution of uncertainty is illustrated by surface filling-
in: Discounting the illuminant creates uncertainty by suppressing surface color and 
brightness signals except near surface discontinuities. Higher stages of filling-in complete 
the surface representation using properties that are complementary to those whereby 
boundaries are formed, guided by signals from these boundaries. 
Complementary form and motion interactions 
In the visual cortex, a third parallel processing stream, passing through LGN-4B-
Thick Stripe-MT, processes motion information (Figure I) (Albright et al., 1984; Maunsell 
& van Essen, 1983; Newsome et al., 1983). Why does a separate motion stream exist, 
given that individual cells in cortical area VI are already sensitive to aspects of both form 
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and motion? In what sense are form and motion computations complementary? What do 
interactions between form and motion accomplish from a functional point of view? 
Modeling work suggests how these streams and their mutual interactions compensate for 
complementary deficiencies of each stream towards generating percepts of moving-form-in-
depth (Baloch & Grossberg, 1997; Francis & Grossberg, 1996). Such motion percepts arc 
called 'formotion' percepts because they arise from a form-motion interaction. 
The form system uses orientationally tuned computations while the motion system 
uses directionally tuned computations. In the formotion model, the processing of form by 
the boundary stream uses orientationally tuned cells (Rubel & Wiesel, 1977) to generate 
emergent object representations, such as the Kanizsa square (Figure 2). Such emergent 
boundary and surface representations, rather than just the energy impinging on our retinas, 
define the form percepts of which we are consciously aware. Precise orientationally tuned 
comparisons of left eye and right eye inputs are also used to compute sharp estimates of the 
relative depth of an object from its observer (Ohzawa et al., 1990; von der Heydt et al., 
1981 ), and thereby to form three-dimensional boundary and surface representations of 
objects separated from their backgrounds (Grossberg, 1994; Grossberg and McLoughlin, 
1997; McLoughlin and Grossberg, 1998). 
How is this orientation information used by the motion stream? An object can 
contain contours of many different orientations which all move in the same direction as part 
of the object's motion. Both psychophysical and neurophysiological experiments have 
shown that the motion stream pools information from many orientations that are moving in 
the same direction to generate precise estimates of a moving object's direction and speed 
(Albright et al., 1984; Ben-Av & Shiffrar, 1995; Maunsell & van Essen, 1983; Newsome 
et al., 1983'Watanabe, 1997; Wuerger et al., 1996). Lesions of the form system also show 
that, on its own, the motion system can make only coarse depth estimates (Logothetis et 
al., 1990; Schiller et al., 1990). Thus it seems reasonable that the orientationally-tuned 
form system generates emergent representations of forms with precise depth estimates, 
whereas the directionally-tuned motion system - on its own - can generate only coarse 
depth estimates. In this conception, orientation and direction are complementary properties, 
since orientation is computed parallel to a contour, whereas, at least in the absence of 
contextual constraints, direction is computed perpendicular to it (Wallach, 1976). 
How does the motion stream pool information across space from multiple oriented 
contours to generate precise estimates of an object's direction and speed? How do the 
emergent object boundaries that are computed with precise depth estimates in the form 
stream get injected into the motion stream and thereby enable the motion stream to track 
emergent object representations in depth? These are large questions with complex answers 
on which many investigators are working. Classical computational models of motion 
detection involving Reichardt-like or motion-energy mechanisms have focused on the 
recovery of local motion directions (Adelson & Bergen, 1985; van Santen & Sperling, 
1984; Watson & Ahumada, 1985). Cells in motion processing areas like MT, however, are 
sensitive to both the direction and the speed of moving patterns (Allman et al., 1985; 
Maunsell & van Essen, 1983), and both direction and speed estimates are needed to track 
moving objects. More recent models have proposed how motion signals can be 
differentiated and pooled over multiple orientations and spatial locations to form global 
estimates of both object direction and speed (Chey et al., 1997, 1998). 
The present discussion of motion perception focuses on how the complementary 
uncertainties of the form and motion streams may be overcome by their interaction. There is 
evidence for an interstream interaction from area V2 of the form stream to area MT of the 
motion stream (Figure 1 ). This interaction could enable depthful form representations that 
are computed in area V2 to be tracked by the motion stream at their correct depths as they 
move through time. A model of this formotion interaction has successfully simulated many 
perceptual and brain data about motion perception (Baloch & Grossberg, 1997; Chey et al., 
1997; Francis & Grossberg, 1996; Grossberg & Rudd, 1992) This model also predicts an 
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important functional role for percepts of long-range apparent motion, whereby observers 
perceive continuous motion between properly timed but spatially stationary flashes of color 
or brightness. These continuous motion interpolations can be used to track targets, such as 
prey and predators, that intermittently disappear as they move at variable rates behind 
occluding cover, such as bushes and trees in a forest. The "flashes" are the intermittent 
appearances of the prey or predator. This prediction has not yet been tested 
neurophysiologically. 
• • 
• • 
Figure 4. Images used to demonstrate that apparent motion of illusory figures arises 
through interactions of the static illusory figures, but not from the inducing elements 
themselves. Frame I (row I) is followed by Frame 2 (row 2) in the same spatial locations. 
With correctly chosen image sizes, distances, and temporal displacements, an illusory 
square is seen to move continuously from the inducers in the left picture of Frame I to the 
inducers in the right picture of Frame 2. [Reprinted with permission from Ramachandran 
( 1985).] 
Figure 4 illustrates an experimental display that vividly illustrates such a formation 
interaction. In Frame I, the pac men at the left side of the Figure define a Kanizsa square 
via the boundary completion process that takes place within the form stream. In Frame 2, 
the pac men are replaced by closed disks, and a square region is cleared in the line array to 
the right. As a result, an illusory square forms adjacent lo the line ends. The pac men and 
line arrays were designed so that none of their features could be matched. Only the 
emergent squares have matching features. When Frame 2 is turned on right after Frame I is 
turned off, the square appears to move continuously from the pac man array to the line 
array. This percept is an example of apparent motion, since nothing in the images actually 
moves. The percept is a "double illusion" because both the emergent forms and their 
motions are visual illusions. The theory suggests that the illusory square boundaries are 
generated in the form stream before being injected into the motion stream, where they are 
the successive "flashes" that generate a wave of apparent motion. 
It seems plausible that some of the quantized temporal effects which Geissler, 
Elliott, and their colleagues have reported during apparent motion experiments (see this 
volume) may be at least partially explained by how these model mechanisms respond to a 
repetitive sequence of flashes, particularly the way in which habituative transmitter gates 
(or depressing synapses) within the transient channels of the models are periodically 
inactivated and recover in response to such repetitive sequences. 
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Complementary What and Where processing: Expectation learning and 
matching 
Complementary form and motion processing are proposed to be pmt of a larger design for 
complementary processing whereby objects in the world are cognitively recognized, 
spatially localized, and acted upon. The form stream inputs to the inferotemporal cortex, 
whereas the motion stream inputs to the parietal cortex (Figure 1). Many cognitive 
neuroscience experiments have supported the hypotheses of Ungerleider and Mishkin 
(Mishkin et a!., 1983; Ungerleider & Mishkin, 1982) and of Goodale and Milner (1992) 
that inferotemporal cortex and its cortical projections learn to categorize and recognize what 
objects are in the world, whereas the parietal cortex and its cortical projections learn to 
determine where they are and how to deal with them by locating them in space, tracking 
them through time, and directing actions towards them. This design thus separates sensory 
and cognitive processing from spatial and motor processing. 
These hypotheses have not, however, noted that sensory and cognitive learning 
processes are complementary to spatial and motor learning processes on a mechanistic 
level. Neural modeling has clarified how sensory and cognitive processes solve a key 
problem, called the stability-plasticity dilemma (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; 
Grossberg, 1999b; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996), and can thus rapidly and stably learn 
about the world throughout life without catastrophically forgetting our previous 
experiences. In other words, our brains remain plastic and open to new experiences 
without risking the stability of previously learned memories. This type of fast stable 
learning enables us to become experts at dealing with changing environmental conditions: 
Old knowledge representations can be refined by changing contingencies, and new ones 
built up, without destroying the old ones due to catastrophic forgetting. 
On the other hand, catastrophic forgetting is a good property for spatial and motor 
learning. We have no need to remember all the spatial and motor representations (notably 
motor maps and gains) that we used when we were children. In fact, the parameters that 
controlled our small childhood limbs would cause major problems if they continued to 
control our larger and stronger adult limbs. This forgetting property of the motor system 
should not be confused with the more stable sensory and cognitive representations with 
which they interact that, for example, help us to ride a bike after years of disuse 
These distinct 'What' and 'Where' memory properties are proposed to follow from 
complementary mechanisms whereby these systems learn expectations about the world, 
and match these expectations against world data. To see how we use a sensory or cognitive 
expectation, suppose you were asked to "find the yellow ball within one-half second, and 
you will win a $10,000 prize". Activating an expectation of 'yellow balls' enables more 
rapid detection of a yellow ball, and with a more energetic neural response, than if you 
were not looking for it. Neural correlates of such excitatory priming and gain control have 
been reported by several laboratories (Hupe eta!., 1998; Kapadia eta!., 1995; Luck et al., 
1997; Motter, 1993; Reynolds et a!., 1999; Roelfsema, 1998; Watanabe et a!., 1998). 
Sensory and cognitive top-clown expectations hereby lead to excitatory matching with 
confirmatory bottom-up data. On the other hand, mismatch between top-down expectations 
and bottom-up data can suppress the mismatched part of the bottom-up data, and thereby 
start to focus attention upon the matched, or expected, part of the bottom-up data. This sort 
of excitatory matching and attentional focusing of boUom-up data with top-down 
expectations is proposed to generate resonant brain states that support conscious 
experiences (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1999b; Grossberg & Merrill, 
1996). 1 proposed in the mid 1970's that "all conscious states are resonant states" and 
believe that subsequent data are still compatible with this hypothesis. Paradoxical data 
about conscious perceptual experiences from several modalities have been explained as 
emergent properties of such resonant states, including properties of synchronous binding 
(Grossberg, 1996b; Grossberg & Somers, 1991). 
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In contrast, a motor expectation represents where we want to move, such as to the 
position where our hand can grasp a desired object Such a motor expectation is matched 
against where the hand is. After the hand moves to the desired position, no further 
movement is required, and movement stops. Motor expectations hereby control inhibitory 
matching. Inhibitory matching does not lead to brain resonance, so motor processing is not 
conscious. In summary, in the present theory, sensory and cognitive matching are 
excitatory, whereas spatial and motor matching are inhibitory. These are complementary 
properties. 
Recent modeling work predicts some of the cells and circuits that are proposed to 
carry out these complementary types of matching. For example, recent modeling has 
suggested how top-down sensory matching is controlled in visual cortex, notably from 
cortical area V2 to VI, and by extension in other sensory and cognitive neocmtical circuits 
(Grossberg, 1999a; Grossberg & Raizada, 2000). This top-down circuit is part of a larger 
model of how bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal interactions are organized within the 
laminar circuits of visual cortex; see Figure 5. The circuit generates top-down outputs from 
cortical layer 6 of V2 that activate, via a possibly polysynaptic pathway, layer 6 of VI. 
Cells in layer 6 of VI, in turn, activate an on-center off-surround circuit to layer 4 of VI. 
(See below for more discussion of on-center off-surround circuits.) The on-center is 
predicted to have a modulatory effect on layer 4, due to the balancing of excitatory and 
inhibitory inputs to layer 4 within the on-center. The inhibitory signals in the off-surround 
can suppress unattended visual features. This top-down circuit realizes a type of folded 
feedback, whereby feedback inputs from V2 are folded back into the feedforward flow of 
information from layer 6-to-4 of V 1. The modulatory nature of the layer 6-to-4 connections 
helps to explain a curious fact about bottom-up cortical design: despite the fact that the 
LGN activates layer 4 of VI indirectly via inputs to layer 6, a separate, direct excitatory 
pathway exists from LGN to layer 4 of VI. It is predicted that this direct pathway is needed 
to enable the LGN to drive layer 4 cells to suprathreshold activity levels, because the 
indirect LGN-6-4 pathway is modulatory. The modeling articles summanze 
neurophysiological, anatomical, and psychophysical experiments that are consistent with 
these predictions. 
Recent modeling work also predicts some of the cells and circuits that are proposed 
to carry out top-clown motor matching, notably in cortical areas 4 and 5 (Bullock et al., 
1998; Cisek et al., 1998). Inhibitory matching is predicted to occur between a Target 
Position Vector (TPV) that represents where we want to move our arm, and a Present 
Position Vector (PPV) that computes an outflow representation of where the arm is now 
(Figure 6). This comparison is proposed to occur at Difference Vector (DV) cells in cortical 
area 5, which compute how far, and in what direction, the ann is commanded to move. 
This Difference Vector is, in turn, predicted to be transmitted to cortical area 4, where is 
multiplicatively gated by a GO signal that is under volitional control. Turning on the GO 
signal determines whether the limb will move, and its amplitude scales the speed of 
movement The product of DV and GO hereby determined a Desired Velocity Vector 
(DVV). Such a DV is predicted to be computed at area 5 phasic cells, and its corresponding 
DDV at area 4 phasic MT cells. The modeling articles summarize neurophysiological, 
anatomical, and psychophysical experiments that are consistent with these predictions. It 
should also be noted that various other cell types within cortical areas 4 and 5 do not do 
inhibitory matching, and may even support resonant states. 
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Figure 5. The LAMINART model synthesis of bottom-up, top-down, and horizontal 
interactions in LGN, VI, and V2. Cells and connections with open symbols denote 
preattentive excitatory mechanisms that are involved in perceptual grouping. Solid black 
symbols denote inhibitory mechanisms. Dashed symbols denote top-down attentional 
mechanisms. [Adapted with permission from Grossberg (1999a).] 
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Figure 6. The VITE circuit model. Thick connections represent the kinematic feedback 
control aspect of the model, with thin connections representing additional compensatory 
circuitry. GO, scaleable gating signal; DVV, desired velocity vector; OPV, outflow position 
vector; OFPV, outflow force+ position vector; SFV, static force vector; IFV, inertial force 
vector; CBM, assumed cerebello-cortical input to the IFV stage; PPV, perceived position 
vector; DV, difference vector; TPV, target position vector; y', dynamic gamma 
motoneuron; y', static gamma motoneuron; a, alpha motoneuron; Ia, type Ia afferent fiber; 
JI, type II afferent fiber (position error feedback); c.s., central sulcus; i.p.s., intraparietal 
sulcus. The symbol + represents excitation, - represents inhibition, X represents 
multiplicative gating, and + f represents integration. [Reprinted with permission from 
Bullock, Cisek, and Grossberg (1998).] 
The learning processes that accompany these complementary types of matching are also 
proposed to exhibit complementary properties. Learning within the sensory and cognitive 
domain is often match learning. Match learning occurs only if a good enough match occurs 
between active top-down expectations and bottom-up information. When such an 
approximate match occurs, previously stored knowledge can be refined. If novel 
information cannot form a good enough match with the expectations that are read-out by 
previously learned recognition categories, then a memory search is triggered that leads to 
selection and learning of a new recognition category, rather than catastrophic forgetting of 
an old one (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1999b; Grossberg & Merrill, 
1996). In contrast, learning within spatial and motor processes is proposed to be mismatch 
learning that continuously updates sensory-motor maps (Guenther et a!., 1994) or the 
gains of sensory-motor commands (Fiala et al., 1996; Ito, 1984). Thus both learning and 
matching within the What and Where streams may have complementary properties. As a 
result, we can stably learn what is happening in a changing world, thereby solving the 
stability-plasticity dilemma, while adaptively updating our representations of where objects 
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are and how to act upon them using bodies whose parameters change continuously through 
time. 
Complementary attentive-learning and orienting-search. 
Match learning has the great advantage that it leads to stable memories in response to 
changing environmental conditions. It also has a potentially disastrous disadvantage, 
however: If you can only learn when there is a good enough match between bottom-up data 
and learned top-down expectations, then how do you ever learn anything that you do not 
already know? Some popular learning models, such as back propagation, try to escape this 
problem by assuming that the brain does only 'supervised learning'. During supervised 
learning, an explicit correct answer, or teaching signal, is provided in response to every 
input. This teaching signal forces learning to track the correct answer. Such a model cannot 
learn if an explicit answer is not provided. It appears, however, that much human and 
animal learning, especially during the crucial early years of life, takes place in a relatively 
unsupervised fashion. 
Other models do allow 'unsupervised learning' to occur. Here, the key problem to 
be solved is, that if a teacher is not available to force the selection and learning of a 
representation that can map onto a correct answer, then the internal dynamics of the model 
must do so on their own. In order to escape the problem of not being able to learn 
something that one docs not already know, some of these models assume that we do 
already know (or, more exactly, have internal representations for) everything that we may 
ever wish to know, and that experience just selects and amplifies these representations 
(Edelman, 1987). These models depend upon the bottom-up filtering of inputs, and a very 
large number of internal representations that respond to these filtered inputs, to provide 
enough memory to represent whatever may happen. Having such a large number of 
representations leads to a combinatorial explosion, with an implausibly large memory. 
Thus, although using a very large number of representations can help with the problem of 
catastrophic forgetting, it creates other, equally serious, problems instead. Other 
unsupervised learning models shut down learning as time goes on in order to avoid 
catastrophic forgetting (Kohonen, 1984). 
I propose that these problems are averted in the brain through the use of another 
complementary interaction. This complementary interaction helps to balance between 
processing the familiar and the unfamiliar, the expected and the unexpected. It does so 
using complementary processes of resonance and reset, which are predicted to subserve 
properties of attention/consciousness and memory search, respectively. This interaction 
enables the brain to discover and stably learn new representations for novel events in an 
efficient way, without assuming that representations already exist for as yet unexperienced 
events. It hereby solves the combinatorial explosion while also solving the stability-
plasticity dilemma. 
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Figure 7. Search for a recognition code within an ART learning circuit: (A) The input 
pattern I is instated across the feature detectors at level F 1 as a short term memory (STM) 
activity pattern X. Input I also nonspecifically activates the orienting subsystem A. STM 
pattern X is represented by the hatched pattern across F 1• Pattern X both inhibits A and 
generates the output patternS. PatternS is multiplied by long term memory (LTM) traces, 
or learned adaptive weights. These LTM-gated signals are added at F 2 nodes to form the 
14 
input pattern T, which activates the STM pattern Y across the recognition categories coded 
at level F2• (B) Pattern Y generates the top-down output pattern U which is multiplied by 
top-down LTM traces and added at F 1 nodes to form the prototype pattern V that encodes 
the learned expectation of the active F 2 nodes. If V mismatches I at F 1, then a new STM 
activity pattern X* is generated at F 1• X* is represented by the hatched pattern. It includes 
the features of I that are confirmed by V. Mismatched features are inhibited. The 
inactivated nodes corresponding to unconfirmed features of X are unhatched. The 
reduction in total STM activity which occurs when X is transformed into X* causes a 
decrease in the total inhibition from F, to A. (C) If inhibition decreases sufficiently, A 
releases a nonspecifrc arousal wave to F2, which resets the STM pattern Y at F,. (D) After 
Y is inhibited, its top-down prototype signal is eliminated, and X can be reinstated at F 1• 
Enduring traces of the prior reset lead X to activate a different STM pattern Y at F,. If the 
top-down prototype due to Y also mismatches I at F" then the search for an appropl·iate F 2 
code continues until a more appropriate F 2 representation is selected. Then an attentive 
resonance develops and learning of the attended data is initiated. [Adapted with permission 
from Carpenter and Grossberg (1987).] 
One of these complementary subsystems is just the What' stream that was described above, 
with its top-down expectations that are matched against bottom-up inputs. When a 
recognition category activates a top-down expectation that achieves a good enough match 
with bottom-up data, this match process focuses attention upon those feature clusters in the 
bottom-up input that are expected (Figure 7). Experimental evidence for such matching and 
attentional processes has been found in neurophysiological data about perception and 
recognition (Bullier et al., 1996; Hupe et al., 1998; Motter, 1994a, 1994b; Reynolds et al., 
1999; Roelfsema et al., 1998; Sillito et al., 1994). Many behavioral and neural data have 
been explained by assuming that such top-down feedback processes can lead to resonant 
brain states that play a key role in dynamically stabilizing both developmental and learning 
processes (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1982, 1987, 1999a, 1999b; 
Grossberg, et al., 1997; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996; Grossberg & Myers, 2000). 
How does a sufficiently bad mismatch between an active top-down expectation and 
a bottom-up input drive a memory search, say because the input represents an unfamiliar 
type of experience? This mismatch within the attentional system is proposed to activate a 
complementary orienting system, which is sensitive to unexpected and unfamiliar events. 
Output signals from the orienting system rapidly reset the recognition category that has 
been reading out the poorly matching top-down expectation (Figure 7B and 7C). The cause 
of the mismatch is hereby removed, thereby freeing the system to activate a different 
recognition category (Figure 7D). The reset event hereby triggers memory search, or 
hypothesis testing, which automatically leads to the selection of a recognition category that 
can better match the input. If no such recognition category exists, say because the bottom-
up input represents a truly novel experience, then the search process can automatically 
activate an as yet uncommitted population of cells, with which to learn about the novel 
information. This learning process works well under both unsupervised and supervised 
conditions. Supervision can force a search for new categories that may be culturally 
determined, and are not based on feature similarity alone. For example, separating the 
letters E and F into separate recognition categories is culturally determined; they are quite 
similar based on visual similarity alone. Taken together, the interacting processes of 
attentive-learning and orienting-search realize a type of error correction through hypothesis 
testing that can build an ever-growing, self-refining internal model of a changing world. 
The complementary attentive-learning and orienting-search subsystems and how 
they interact have been progressively developed since the 1970's within Adaptive 
Resonance Theory, or ART (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1991; Grossberg, 1999b; Grossberg 
& Merrill, 1996). Neurobiological data have elsewhere been reviewed in support of the 
ART hypothesis that the attentive-learning system includes such What processing regions 
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as inferotemporal cortex and its projections in prefrontal cortex, whereas the orienting-
search system includes circuits of the hippocampal system (Grossberg & Merrill, 1996). 
Data about mismatch cells in the hippocampal system are particularly relevant to this 
hypothesis (Otto & Eichenbaum, 1992). ART predicts that these interactions between 
inferotemporal cortex and the hippocampal system during a mismatch event offset the 
inability of the What processing stream to search for and learn appropriate new recognition 
codes on its own. This deficiency of the What stream has been used to predict how 
hippocampal lesions can lead to symptoms of amnesic memory (Grossberg & Merrill, 
1996). Because of their ability to learn stably in real-time about large amounts of 
information in a rapidly changing world, ART models have also been used in pattern 
recognition applications in technology (Carpenter & Grossberg, 1996). 
Complementary additive and subtractive intrastream processing. 
The two types of matching across the What and Where processing streams use different 
combinations of excitatory and inhibitory neural signals. Complementary processes that 
uses excitatory and inhibitory interactions can also arise within a processing stream. Thus, 
each processing stream may be broken into complementary substreams. Several examples 
will now be mentioned wherein parallel combinations of additive and subtractive neural 
signals can be computed within a single processing stream. A classical example in the What 
processing stream combines outputs from long-wave length (L) and medium wave-length 
(M) retinal photoreceptors into parallel luminance (L + M) and color (L - M) channels 
(Mollon & Sharpe, 1983). The color channels compute reflectances, or ratios, by 
discounting the illuminant, while the luminance channel computes luminant energy. By 
using both channels, the illuminant can be discounted without throwing away information 
aboutluminant energy. 
Intrastream complementarity also seems to occur within the Where stream. Here, 
cortical area MT activates area MST (not shown in Figure 1) on the way to parietal cortex. 
In macaque monkeys, the ventral part of MST helps to track moving visual objects, 
whereas dorsal MST helps to navigate in the world using global properties of optic flow 
(Duffy & Wurtz, 1995; Tanaka et al., 1993). These tasks are behaviorally complementary: 
the former tracks an object moving in the world with respect to an observer, whereas the 
latter navigates a moving observer with respect to the world. The tasks are also 
neurophysiologically complementary: Neurons in ventral MST compute the relative motion 
of an object with respect to its background by subtracting background motion from object 
motion; whereas neurons in dorsal MST compute motions of a wide textured field by 
adding motion signals over a large visual domain (Tanaka et al., 1993). Corresponding to 
MST's breakdown into additive and subtractive subregions, area MT of owl monkeys 
possesses distinct bands and interbands (Born & Tootell, 1992). Band cells have additive 
receptive fields for visual navigation, whereas interband cells have subtractive receptive 
fields for computing object-relative motion. Modeling studies have shown how these 
complementary properties can be used, on the one hand, for visual navigation using optical 
flow information and, on the other hand, for predictive tracking of moving targets using 
smooth pursuit eye movements (Grossberg et al., 1999; Pack et al., 2000). These studies 
make a number of neurophysiological predictions, including how the log polar mapping 
that is defined by the cortical magnification factor helps to achieve good navigational 
properties. A remarkable prediction is that the biologically observed spiral tuning curves 
that were found by Graziano et al. (1994) in cortical area MST maximize the amount of 
position in variance of which the positionally-variant log polar map is capable. 
Intrastream complementarity is also predicted to occur during sensory-motor 
control, or How processing. To see this, suppose that both eyes fixate an object that can be 
reached by the arms. Psychophysical (Foley, 1980) and neurophysiological data 
(Grobstein, 1991; Sakata et al., 1980) suggest that the vergence of the two eyes, as they 
fixate the object, is used to estimate the object's radial distance, while the spherical angles 
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that the eyes make relative to the observer's head estimate the object's angular position. 
Distance and angle are mathematically independent properties of an object's position with 
respect to an observer. How does the brain compute the distance and angle to an object that 
the eyes are fixating? A neural model proposes how addition and subtraction can again 
realize the necessary computations by exploiting the bilateral symmetry of the body 
(Guenther eta!., 1994). In particular, eye movement control pathways give rise to parallel 
branches, called corollary discharges, that inform other brain systems of the present 
position of the eyes (Helmholtz, 1910/1925). These outtlow movement control pathways 
have an opponent organization to control the body's agonist and antagonist muscles. 
Neural modeling has mathematically proved that, when both eyes fixate an object, accurate 
spherical angle and vergence estimates of object position may be derived by adding and 
subtracting, respectively, the ocular corollary discharges that control the two eyes, while 
preserving their opponent relationships, at separate populations of angle and vergence cells 
(Guenther eta!., 1994). 
These examples illustrate how complementary behavioral capabilities can be derived 
by doing "brain arithmetic", whereby outputs of a processing stage are segregated into 
additive and subtractive parallel computations at a subsequent processing stage. Such 
additive and subtractive combinations can occur both between processing streams and 
within a single processing stream. These simple computations generate very different 
behavioral properties when applied to different sensory inputs or different stages of a 
processing stream. The next sections illustrate several ways in which complementary 
multiplication and division operations may enter the brain's "arithmetic" repertoire. 
Factorization of pattern and energy: ratio processing and synchrony 
Multiplication and division occur during processes that illustrate the general theme of how 
the brain achieves ji1ctorization of pattern and energy (Grossberg, 1982). 'Pattern' here 
refers to the hypothesis that the brain's functional units of short-term representation of 
information, and of long-term learning about this information, are distributed patterns of 
activation and of synaptic weight, respectively, across a neuronal network. 'Energy' refers 
to the mechanisms whereby pattern processing is turned on and off by activity-dependent 
modulatory processes. 
Why do pattern and energy need to be processed separately? Why cannot a single 
process do both? One reason is that cell activities can fluctuate within only a narrow 
dynamic range. Often input amplitudes can vary over a much wider dynamic range. For 
example, if a large number of input pathways converge on a cell, then the number of active 
input pathways can vary greatly through time, and with it, the total size of the cell input. 
Owing to the small dynamic range of the cell, its activity could easily become saturated 
when a large number of inputs is active. If all the cells got saturated, then their activities 
could not sensitively represent the relative size, and thus importance, of their respective 
inputs. One way to prevent this would be to require that each individual input be chosen 
very small so that the sum of all inputs would not saturate cell activity. But such small 
individual inputs could easily be lost in cellular noise. The cell's small dynamic range could 
hereby make it insensitive to both small and large inputs as a result of noise and saturation, 
respectively, at the lower and upper extremes of the cell's dynamic range. This noise-
saturation dilemm.a faces all biological cells, not merely nerve cells. Interactions across a 
network of cells is needed to compute the relative sizes of inputs to cells in the network, 
and thereby to overcome noise and saturation. This kind of pattern processing sacrifices 
information about the absolute amplitude of inputs in order to enable the cells to respond 
sensitively to their relative size, over a wide dynamic range. Since the pattern processing 
network discards information about absolute input size, a separate channel is needed to 
track information about the total amplitude, or 'energy', of the inputs. 
Retaining sensitivity to the relative size of inputs can be accomplished by on-center 
off-surround interactions between cells that obey the membrane equations of 
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neurophysiology (Douglas eta!., 1995; Heeger, 1993; Grossberg, 1982). In a feedforward 
on-center, off-surround network, feedforward inputs excite their target cells while 
inhibiting a broader spatial range of cells. To store inputs temporarily in short-term (or 
working) memory, excitatory feedback between nearby cells and inhibitory feedback 
between a broader spatial range of cells can solve the noise-saturation dilemma. Stated in 
another way, these networks define mass-action interactions among shmt-range 
cooperative and longer-range competitive inputs or activities. The mass action terms of 
membrane equations introduce multiplication into brain arithmetic by multiplying cell inputs 
with cell voltages, or activities. Membrane equations respond to on-center off-surround 
interactions by dividing each cell's activity by a weighted sum of all the cell inputs (in a 
feedforward interaction) or activities (in a feedback interaction) with which it interacts. This 
operation keeps cell activities away from the saturation range by normalizing them while 
preserving their sensitivity to input ratios. 
The ubiquitous nature of the noise-saturation dilemma in all cellular tissues clarifies 
why such on-center off-surround anatomies are found throughout the brain. For example, 
when ratio processing and normalization occur during visual perception, they help to 
control brightness constancy and contrast (Arrington, 1994; Grossberg & Todorovic', 
1988) as well as perceptual grouping and attention (Gove et a!., 1995; Grossberg, 1999a; 
Grossberg & Raizada, 2000; Grossberg et al., 1997). At higher levels of cognitive 
processing, these mechanisms can provide a neural explanation of the 'limited capacity' of 
cognitive short-term memory (Grossberg, 1987). 
The cooperative-competitive interactions that preserve cell sensitivity to relative 
input size also bind these cell activities into functional units. Indeed, relative activities need 
to be computed synchronously, and early theorems about short-term memory and long-
term memory processing (Grossberg, 1982) predicted an important role for synchronous 
processing between the interacting cells. Subsequent neurophysiological experiments have 
emphasized the functional importance of synchronous brain states (Eckhorn et al., 1988; 
Gray & Singer, 1989). More recent neural modeling has shown how such synchronized 
activity patterns can, for example, quantitatively explain psychophysical data about 
temporal order judgments during perceptual grouping within the visual cortex (Grossberg 
& Grunewald, 1997). The synchronous states that arise in ART networks are another 
example of the synchronizing property of suitably defined cooperative-competitive 
networks. 
Factorization of motor expectation and volition 
Factorization of pattern and energy shows itself in many guises. For example, it helps to 
explain how motor expectations (pattern) interact with volitional speed signals (energy) to 
generate goal-directed arm movements (Bullock et al., 1993; Georgoplous et al., 1986; 
Horak & Anderson, 1984), as during the computation of the Desired Velocity Vector in the 
cortical area 4 circuit of Figure 6. As noted in the discussion of Where and How 
processing, a motor expectation represents where we want to move, such as to the position 
where our hand can grasp a desired object. Such a motor representation, or Target Position 
Vector (TPV), can prime a movement, or get us ready to make a movement, but by itself, it 
cannot release the movement (Bullock et al., 1998; Georgopolous et a!., 1986). First the 
TPV needs to be converted into a Difference Vector (DV), which triggers an overt action 
only when a volitional signal (Horak & Anderson, 1984) that multiplicatively gates action 
read-out. The volitional signal for controlling movement speed is called a GO signal, as in 
Figure 6. The signal for controlling size is called a GRO signal. Neural models have 
predicted how such GO and GRO signals may, for example, alter the size and speed of 
handwritten script without altering its form (Bullock et a!., 1993; Grossberg & Paine, 
2000). As noted in Figure 6, some motor expectations seem to be computed in the parietal 
and motor cortex. Volitional signals seem to be computed within the basal ganglia (Brown 
et al., 2000; Horak & Anderson, 1984). 
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The Vector Integration to Endpoint, or VITE, neural model, summarized in Figure 
6, of how these arm-controlling pattern and energy factors combine within cortical areas 4 
and 5 has been used to predict the functional roles of six identified cortical cell types, and to 
quantitatively simulate their temporal responses during a wide range of behavioral tasks 
(Bullock eta!., 1998; Cisek et a!., 1998). These results support model hypotheses about 
how variable-speed and variable-force ann movements can be carried out in the presence of 
obstacles. The model hereby provides a detailed example of how task-sensitive volitional 
control of action realizes an overall separation into pattern and energy variables. 
Factorization of attentive cognitive-emotional interactions 
Cognitive-emotional learning enables sensory and cognitive events to acquire emotional and 
motivational significance. Both classical and instrumental conditioning can be used for this 
purpose (Kamin, 1969; Pavlov, 1927; Skinner, 1938; Staddon, 1983). For example, 
during classical conditioning, an irrelevant sensory cue, or conditioned stimulus (CS), is 
paired with a reinforcing event, or unconditioned stimulus (US). The CS hereby acquires 
some of the reinforcing properties of the US; it becomes a "conditioned reinforcer" with its 
own motivational properties. The manner in which the thalamocortical representation of a 
conditioned reinforcer CS is influenced by motivational signals represents, I suggest, 
another example of factorization of pattern and energy. Here, the activities across the 
thalamocortical representations of recently presented sensory events, including the CS, 
constitute the "pattern". This pattern is normalized by the feedback on-center off-surround 
interactions that are used to store the activities in short-term memory without saturation. If 
one or more of these sensory events is a conditioned reinforcer, then it can amplify its own 
activity via learned motivational feedback signals, which play the role of "energy" in this 
example (Grossberg, I 982; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996). These amplified representations 
can, in turn, attentionally block (Kamin, 1969), or inhibit, the representations of irrelevant 
sensory events via the off-surround of the feedback network. Attention a! blocking is one of 
the key mechanisms whereby animals learn which consequences are causally predicted by 
their antecedent sensory cues and actions, and which consequences are merely accidental. 
A more detailed summary of how blocking is proposed to happen is now given. 
During cognitive-emotional learning, at least three types of internal representations 
interact: Sensory and cognitive representations (S), drive representations (D), and motor 
representations (M) (Grossberg, 1982; Grossberg & Merrill, 1996), as depicted in Figure 
8. The sensory representations S are thalamocortical representations of external events, like 
the ones described above within the 'What' processing stream. They include 
representations of CSs. D representations include the hypothalamic and amygdala circuits at 
which homeostatic and reinforcing cues converge to generate emotional reactions and 
motivational decisions (Aggleton, 1993; Davis, 1994; LeDoux, 1993). M representations 
include cortical and cerebellar circuits for controlling discrete adaptive responses (Ito, 1984; 
Thompson, 1988). As noted above, the S representations represent the pattern information 
in this example. They interact with one another via an on-center off-surround feedback 
network that stores their activities in short-term memory, while also solving the noise-
saturation dilemma. 
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Figure 8. Schematic conditioning circuit: Conditioned stimuli (CS;) activate sensory 
categories (Scs), which compete among themselves for limited capacity short-term memory 
activation and storage. The activated Sc,; representations, i = I, 2, elicit trainable signals to 
drive representations D and motor command representations M. Learning from a sensory 
representation Scs; to a drive representation D is called conditioned reinforcer learning. 
Learning from D to a Scs; is called incentive motivational learning. Signals from D to Scs; 
are elicited when the combination of conditioned sensory plus internal drive inputs is 
sufficiently large. Sensory representations that win the competition in response to the 
balance of external inputs and internal motivational signals can activate motor command 
pathways. 
The D representations supply modulatory energy owing to the action of the following types 
of learning processes: 
(l) 'Conditioned reinforcer learning' occurs in the S -> D pathways, and enables a 
sensory event, such as a conditioned stimulus CS, to become a conditioned reinforcer that 
can activate a drive representation D. This may be accomplished by pairing the CS with an 
unconditioned stimulus US. The CS activates its sensory representation S. The US 
activates its own sensory representation, which in turn activates the drive representation D. 
Adaptive weights in the S ·-> D pathway can grow in response to this correlated activity. 
Future presentations of the CS can hereby lead to activation of D, which controls various 
emotional and motivational responses. 
(2) Due to this pairing of CS and US, 'incentive motivational learning' can also 
occur in the adaptive weights within the D -> S pathway. This type of learning allows an 
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activated drive representation D to prime, or modulate, the sensory representations S of all 
sensory events that have consistently been activated with it in the past. Speaking intuitively, 
these sensory events are motivationally compatible with D. 
(3) S -+ M 'habit learning', or motor learning, trains the sensorimotor maps and 
gains that control appropriate and accurately calibrated responses to the CS. These 
processes include circuits such as those summarized in Figure 6. 
Conditioned reinforcer learning and incentive motivational learning combine to 
control attentional blocking in the following way. As noted above, the sensory 
representations S are the pattern variables that store sensory and cognitive representations 
in short-term memory using on-center off-surround feedback networks. Due to the self-
normalizing properties of these networks, the total activity that can be stored in short-term 
memory across the entire network is limited. This is thus, once again, an example of the 
noise-saturation dilemma. Due to activity normalization, sufficiently great activation of one 
sensory representation implies that other sensory representations cannot be stored in short-
term memory. In the present example, conditioning of a CS to a US strengthens both its S 
-> D conditioned reinforcer and D -+ S incentive motivational pathways. Thus, when a 
conditioned reinforcer CS activates its sensory representation S, learned S -> D -+ S 
positive feedback quickly amplifies the activity of S. This S ·-> D -+ S feedback pathway 
supplies the motivational energy that focuses attention upon salient conditioned reinforcers. 
These amplified sensory representations inhibit the storage of other sensory cues in short-
term memory via the lateral inhibition that exists among the sensory representations S. 
Blocking is hereby explained using incentive motivational "energy" to amplify conditioned 
reinforcer CS representations within the self-normalized sensory "pattern" that is stored in 
short-term memory. This S -+ D-+ S feedback causes a cognitive-emotional resonance to 
occur. The model prediction of how drive representations D, such as those in the 
amgydala, influence blocking by delivering incentive motivational feedback to 
thalamocortical sensory representations has not yet been tested. 
It was proposed in Grossberg (2000b) how such a cognitive-emotional model, 
which is called a CogEM model, can explain many data about the negative symptoms of 
schizophrenia when its drive representations D get depressed. It was also shown how all 
the circuit elements of the recent Damasio (I 999) model of "core consciousness" can be 
naturally mapped onto those of the CogEM model. In particular, activation of the S-D 
feedback loop causes a cognitive-emotional resonance that is predicted to support conscious 
states. This linkage predicts how depression of D can influence core consciousness in 
schizophrenics. 
Factorization of 1·ate-invariant speech and rhythm 
Factorization of pattern and energy also seems to play an important role in temporally 
organized cognitive processes such as speech and language. Here sequences of events are 
transformed into temporally evolving spatial patterns of activation that are stored within 
working memories (Baddeley, I 986). The 'pattern' information that is stored in working 
memory represents both the event itself - it's so-called item information - and the 
temporal order in which the events occurred. The 'energy' information encodes both the 
temporal rate and rhythm with which the events occur (Grossberg, I 987). Factorization of 
information about item and order from information about rate and rhythm helps us to 
understand speech that is spoken at variable rates: A rate-invariant representation of 
speech and language in working memory avoids the need to define multiple representations 
of the same speech and language utterance at every conceivable rate. This representation 
can, in turn, be used to Jearn speech and language codes, or categories, that are themselves 
not too sensitive to speech rate. Because rate and rhythm information are substantially 
eliminated from the rate-invariant working memory representation, rate and rhythm need to 
be computed by a separate process. This is a problem of factorization, rather than of 
independent representation, because the speech rate and rhythm that are perceived depend 
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upon the categorical language units, such as syllables and words, that are familiar to the 
listener. What these language units are, in turn, depends upon how the listener has learned 
to group together, and categorize, the temporally distributed speech and language features 
that have previously been stored in the rate-invariant working memory. 
Rate-invariant working memories can be designed from specialized versions of the 
on-center off-surround feedback networks that are used to solve the noise-saturation 
dilemma (Bradski et al., 1994; Grossberg, 1982, 1987). In other words, the networks that 
are used to store spatially distributed feature patterns, without a loss of sensitivity to their 
identity and relative size, can be specialized to store temporally distributed events, without 
a loss of sensitivity to their identity and temporal order. The normalization of these stored 
activities is the basis for their rate-invariant properties. Thus, this model predicts that a 
process like discounting the illuminant, in the spatial domain, uses a variant of the same 
mechanisms that are used to process rate-invariant speech, in the temporal domain. A key 
problem concerns how the rate-invariant working memory can maintain the same 
representation as the speech rate speeds up. The model predicts that the 'energy' 
information that is computed from the speech rate and rhythm can be used to automatically 
gain-control the processing rate of the working memory to maintain its rate-invariant speech 
properties (Boardman et al., 1999). In particular, the rate at which the working memory 
stores individual events needs to keep up with the overall rate at which successive speech 
sounds are presented. A neural model of this process has been progressively developed to 
quantitatively simulate psychophysical data concerning the categorization of variable-rate 
speech by human subjects (Boardman et al., 1999; Grossberg et al., 1997; Grossberg & 
Myers, 2000), and to functionally interpret neurophysiological data that are consistent with 
model properties (Grossberg & Myers, 2000). In this model, the working memory 
interacts with a categorization network via bottom-up and top-down pathways, and 
conscious speech is a resonant wave that emerges through these interactions. 
A unifying view of how the brain is functionally organized in the large 
Much experimental evidence has supported the idea that the brain is organized into 
processing streams, but how these streams are determined and how they interact to generate 
behavior is still a topic of active research. This article has summarized some of the rapidly 
growing empirical and theoretical evidence that our brains compute cmnplementary 
operations within parallel pairs of processing streams. Table I summarizes some of the 
processes for which evidence of complementarity has been collected from behavioral and 
neural data and models. The variety of these behavioral processes provides some indication 
of the generality of this organizational principle in the brain. Interstream interactions are 
proposed to overcome complementary processing deficiencies within each stream. 
Hierarchical interactions between the several levels of each processing stream are proposed 
to overcome informational uncertainties that occur at individual processing stages within 
that stream. Hierarchical intrastream interactions and parallel interstream interactions work 
together to generate behavioral properties that are free from these uncertainties and 
complementary insufficiencies. Such complementary processing may occur on multiple 
scales of brain organization. 
Many experimentalists have described properties of functional specialization and 
integration in their neural data. Some neural modelers have attempted to characterize such 
properties using concepts about how the brain may work to achieve information 
maximization. Information, as a technical concept, is well defined for stationary 
information channels, or channels whose statistical properties tend to persist through time. 
In contrast, brains self-organize on a relatively fast time scale through development and 
life-long learning, and do so in response to nonstationary, or rapidly changing, statistical 
properties of their environments. I propose that hierarchical intrastream interactions and 
parallel interstream interactions between complementary systems are a manifestation of this 
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capacity for self-controlled and stable self-organization. This observation leads to my final 
remarks. 
How do complementary sets of properties arise, rather than some other combination 
of properties? How is the organization of smaller-scale complementary properties organized 
within larger-scale complementary properties? The simplest hypothesis, for which little 
direct experimental evidence is yet available, is that each pair of complementary processes 
represents two sides of a larger brain system. Complementarity could arise if, during brain 
development, precursors of the larger system bifurcated into complementary streams 
through a process of symmetry-breaking that operates on multiple scales of organization. In 
this view, complementary systems are an integral part of the self-organization process that 
enables the brain to adapt to a rapidly changing world. This view of brain development is 
not in conflict with prevailing views of specific developmental mechanisms (Obermayer et 
a!., 1990). Rather, it points to a global organizational principle that may be capable of 
coordinating them. 
Thus, just as in the organization of the physical world with which it interacts, it is 
proposed that the brain is organized to obey principles of complementarity, uncertainty, and 
symmetry-breaking. In fact, it can be argued that known complementary properties exist 
because of the need to process complementary types of information in the environment. 
The processes that form perceptual boundaries and surfaces provide a particularly clear 
example of this hypothesis. The 'complementary brain' may thus perhaps best be 
understood through analyses of the cycles of perception, cognition, emotion, and action 
whereby the brain is intimately linked to its physical environment through a continuously 
operating feedback cycle. One useful goal of future research may be to study more directly 
how complementary aspects of the physical world are translated into complementary brain 
designs for coping with this world. 
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